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Abstract 
 
Few questions in political science have received more attention in recent times than the 
role of trust in democracy, democratic government, and political participation. In Britain 
this has become a particular concern as levels of democratic engagement in traditional 
politics have declined, exacerbated by media reports of politicians’ untrustworthy 
behaviour. A common feature of previous empirical work on political trust is that trust is 
treated as a single theoretical concept. Scholars have assumed that trust operates in a 
similar fashion across different political institutions — that citizens’ trust mechanisms are 
the same for trusting Parliament, the prime minister, or the European Union. As a 
consequence, the operationalisation of trust has generally been through a single measure. 
In this article we draw on recent research from political theory, where different forms of 
judgements whether to trust – strategic, moral and deliberative – have been 
conceptualized, to argue that trust judgements may vary in application and significance 
depending upon the institution under examination.  Using specially designed datasets 
generated from YouGov’s weekly omnibus and the British Election Study’s Continuous 
Monitoring Panel, we operationalise these three forms of trust judgements to examine trust 
in two British institutions—political parties and politicians. We find, as hypothesised, that 
different forms of trust judgements are of differing significance depending upon the 
institution under consideration. 
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Introduction 
Few questions in political science have received more attention in recent times than the 
role of trust in democracy, democratic government, and political participation. Within this 
literature, several key debates endure. First, whether the level of trust in democracy is 
rising or falling over time (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Macedo 2005; Norris 1999; Skocpol 
2003; Dalton 2006; Zukin et al. 2006; Ladd 1999; Lin 2001; Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley 2004); 
second, whether citizen trust is a prerequisite for good democratic government (Abramson 
and Finifter 1981; Citrin 1974; Citrin et al. 1975; Patterson, Ripley and Quinlan 1992; Dalton 
2004; Hetherington 2005; Mackenzie and Labiner 2002; McDonald and Popkin 2001; Miller 
1974; Nye et al. 1997; Pharr and Putnam 2000; Stokes 1962; Warren 1999); and third, 
whether trust should be conceptualised as a social construct, an institutional dilemma, or 
an economic by-product (Craig, 1993; Miller and Borrelli 1991; Owen and Dennis 2001; 
Duck 1997; Kramer and Tyler 1995; Seligman 1997; Sztompka 1999; Barber 1987; Hart 1978; 
Wright 1976). 
 
Cutting across these debates is a vibrant literature concerned with the generation of trust in 
political institutions. Here, variation in levels of trust across different institutions has been 
attributed to the differences in individual level attributes, e.g. greater interest or 
knowledge of politics (Almond and Verba 1963; Dirks and Skarlicki 2004; Newton and 
Norris 2000); to attributes of the institutions themselves, e.g. the process legitimacy of 
courts (Grosskopf and Mondak 1998; Gibson and Caldeira 1995) or to broad socio-political 
trends in public opinion, e.g. business being more trusted to deal with climate change than 
national governments (Edelman 2008). Individual level attributes have been used to 
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explain surprising empirical findings. For example, scholars of the U.S. Congress have 
found that while trust in Congress as an institution is at an all time low, many citizens 
claim to trust their own member (Bianco 1994; Parker and Parker 1993). A recent poll 
comparing trust in regulating the safety of pharmaceutical drugs, found that nearly half of 
respondents somewhat trust or very strongly trust the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA), the regulatory agency responsible for safety in prescription drugs, whereas only 
20% somewhat trust or very strongly trust Congress (Harris Interactive 2007). Although 
both institutions are deemed responsible for delivering safe food and drugs to the 
American public, respondents make use of differentiated judgements in determining 
which institution is more trustworthy.   
 
Taking an overview of these various debates, we can observe that trust in the political 
sphere involves granting other political actors discretionary powers over the use of 
collective goods while recognizing that this judgement comes at some risk to oneself.  
More precisely, we can distinguish three components in the judgement whether to trust 
another political actor: (i) the perceived particular qualities of the trustee actor (or 
institution), (ii) the trusting characteristics of the truster, and (iii) the presence of 
mechanisms to protect the truster from betrayal by the trustee.  Given the various potential 
interactions between these three components of the trust judgement, there is a strong a 
priori case that various forms of trust judgements operate in the political sphere according 
to the type of political actor/institution to be trusted. An explicit assumption underlying 
this conceptualisation is that the trust judgement operates differently across different 
political institutions; in other words, citizens’ judgements to trust operate differently in 
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trusting Congress or Parliament, the president or prime minister, or for that matter, the 
European Union, NHS, or Federal Reserve.1  
 
Despite the a priori case for the trust judgement as a multidimensional concept (Hibbing 
and Theiss-Morse 1995; Newton 1999; Tucker 2004, 2006, 2008), previous efforts to 
operationalise trust have tended to assume trust functions as a uni-dimensional concept in 
the political sphere (Hetherington 1998; Levi and Stoker 2000; Mishler and Rose 2001).2 
Regardless of whether trust is employed as an independent or dependent variable, asking 
citizens—Do you trust in government?—or—How much trust do you have in government?—has 
generally been the shared standard, and we argue raises questions of the validity of such 
measures. If we accept the assumption that trust operates similarly across different political 
institutions, then previous research has been, at a minimum, face valid. However, there is 
good reason to argue that a trust judgement is not a unidimensional concept, and as a 
result, the operationalisation of trust in the political sphere in previous research fails to tap 
the full range of meanings of the concept. Consequently, empirical accounts of variation in 
trust across institutions may provide only a partial, and perhaps erroneous, explanation. 
 
We aim to contribute to the literature on political trust in reconsidering the construct and 
content validity of political trust. In this article we articulate three forms of trust 
judgement—strategic, moral and deliberative—and test the general hypothesis that 
existing models of trust fail to capture the variation in which trust operates in the public 
sphere. We argue that trust judgements work differently across different institutions and 
test for evidence of three forms of trust judgement in two British institutions, political 
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parties and politicians, and then test whether political trustworthiness is affected by 
political context. We do not make or test the claim that some citizens may have consistent 
preferences for one form of trust judgement over another; instead, the contribution here is 
simply to show that different forms of trust judgement may operate at different times, and 
that individuals may employ different forms of trust judgement for different events or 
situations.  
 
Theorizing Forms of Trust Judgements 
As noted in the previous section, the large literature on political trust indicates that the 
judgement whether to trust another political actor has three components: (i) the perceived 
particular qualities of the trustee actor (or institution), (ii) the trusting characteristics of the 
truster, and (iii) the presence of mechanisms to protect the truster from betrayal by the 
trustee. In this section, we do not aim to present a full typology of the trust concept as it 
appears in the political theory literature; rather we focus on those forms of trust judgement 
that have gained foremost theoretical support among researchers and have driven 
empirical studies to test their validity. 
 
Strategic Trust 
A leading strand in the literature focuses on the first component of the trust judgement as 
it concerns the perceived particular qualities of the trustee actor (or institution). The trust 
judgement is conceived around whether, either anticipating or evaluating cognitive 
understanding of limited information, to place oneself in a position of potential 
vulnerability by granting others discretionary power over one’s interests (Elster 1979; Baier 
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1986; Barber 1987; Dasgupta 1988; Gambetta 1988). Trust, on this reading, should be 
understood solely as the outcome of a rational judgement process. When an individual 
trusts another, it necessarily involves a judgement that the trust extended will not be 
abused, or at least that the consequences of that abuse are outweighed by the potential 
benefits of trusting cooperation.  As Russell Hardin puts it: “you trust someone if you have 
adequate reason to believe it will be in that person’s interests to be trustworthy in the 
relevant way at the relevant time.  One’s trust turns not on one’s own interests but on the 
interests of the trusted. It is encapsulated in one’s judgement of those interests” (1993, 505). 
Elsewhere Hardin argues that, to say that I trust you implies that I “have reason to expect 
you to act, for your own reasons, as my agent with respect to the relevant matter” (1999, 26, 
italics original).  Putting this form of trust in formal terms, trust exists for A when he 
delegates to B control over good C in which A has an interest. Using Hardin’s terminology, 
A has good reason to trust B when A can know that his interests in good C are encapsulated 
in B’s interests in good C, because in knowing this, A knows something about B’s 
motivations (1993; 1999, 24-26).  Therefore, B is trustworthy just to the extent that he attends 
to A’s interests.  
 
In this form, the trust judgement operates as a quid pro quo—in exchange for exposing 
oneself to potential harm, one gains the potential benefits of social cooperation. The 
decision to trust is essentially a strategic judgement on the trusted’s interests. Strategic 
trust judgements are applicable to the types of relationships that occur in the political 
sphere, such as when one trusts professionals, authorities, or institutions. Because distance 
exposes the truster to more opportunities for his vulnerabilities to be exploited, assurance 
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is usually sought on (i) the existence of convergent interests, (ii) that the trusted party has 
the relevant knowledge, skills, and capabilities over the good in question, and (iii) relevant 
past performance.  Only then may trust may be extended with some degree of confidence.  
For example, doctors require professional accreditation in order to practice; authorities’ 
past performance offers evidence of competence and control of free-riding (McAllister 
1995; Scholz and Lubell 1998); and institutions’ displays of administrative fairness help 
explain why citizens obey the law (Tyler and Huo 2002), pay their taxes (Levi 1997; 
Lieberman 2003) and perform military service (Tilly 2005).  
 
In respect of our study, then, we develop four hypotheses to examine strategic trust 
judgements. First, we propose that an individual citizen will trust political parties whose 
policies are perceived to encapsulate that citizen’s policy interests.  According to strategic 
trust, an individual citizen has good reason to trust political parties when that citizen 
understands—on the basis of limited information—that his/her individual interests in a 
policy matter are encapsulated in those parties’ interests in the policy area.  That is, 
political parties are trustworthy in the eyes of an individual citizen to the extent that they 
attend (to the best understanding of the individual citizen) to that citizen’s interests in a 
particular policy matter.  On the basis of this encapsulated trust, citizens will continue to 
find parties trustworthy until citizens perceive their individual interests to no longer be 
served.  This suggests the following hypothesis: 
H1: Citizens will find political parties trustworthy according to the extent to which 
the political parties’ policies reflect the individual’s interests in that policy matter 
(See questions 1 & 2 in tables 1 & 2) 
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Second, we differentiate the trust judgements in political parties from the trust judgement 
in politicians. It is widely noted in the literature that voters trust their local elected 
representative more than the legislature where that representative sits (Bianco 1994; Parker 
and Parker 1993), or the political parties to which they belong (Orren 1997; King 1997).  It is 
less widely understood how trust operates between individual citizens and politicians as a 
class. According to the strategic version of trust, an individual may find a class of 
individuals trustworthy according to two criteria. First, trust is possible when an 
individual is assured of the existence of convergent interests between him/her and the 
class of individuals. Second, trust is possible when the class of individuals possesses 
relevant knowledge, skills, and capabilities over the good in question. In terms then of an 
individual citizen and politicians as a class, strategic type of trust will only be present 
when the citizen is assured of convergent interests with those politicians who have 
exemplified their knowledge of the policy matter in question. In a modern democracy, 
these two criteria of strategic trust can only occur when the citizen critically judges the 
actions and words of the subset of politicians experienced in the relevant policy matter.   
Given the cacophony of voices in a vibrant modern democracy, it is then incumbent upon 
those politicians with experience of a particular policy area to make their actions and 
opinions known through relevant media.3  Therefore, we hypothesize that citizens will 
only find trustworthy those politicians that clearly articulate their positions relevant to a 
particular policy matter so that voters can decide whether their interests are encapsulated 
in those positions.   
H2: Citizens will find politicians trustworthy according how closely politicians’ 
stated interests reflect the individual’s interests in a particular policy matter (See 
question 4 in tables 1 & 2) 
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Third, we need to understand the causal direction in the relationship between past 
performance and trust when a citizen makes the trust judgement. The literature here is 
richest in the context of the evaluation of New Public Management reforms of central 
government. This research suggests that citizens’ trust is a consequence of the efficient and 
effective performance of government and public administration rather than a precondition 
of that performance (Yogoda and Yuval 2003; Nye, Zelikow and King 1997; Verba, 
Schlozman and Brady 1995; Kohut 1998).  Variables investigated as significant to this 
causal relationship include: confidence in service delivery, demography, individuals vs. 
institutions, bureaucracy vs. frontline staff, proven independence of performance 
measurements, expectations of services, organizational type, possibility of dialogue 
between service provider and user, honesty and openness in the political sphere, and 
opposition politicians criticizing government administration to garner votes (Bouckaert 
1995; Bitner 1990; Bouckaert and van de Walle 2003; Bok 1997; Berman 1997; Aberbach and 
Rockman 2000; Christensen and Laegreid 2006; Haque 1998). While this literature has 
tended to focus on public service efficiency and financial accountability of political 
institutions, its basic causal relationship of performance leading to trust offers insights into 
citizens’ strategic trust of political parties and politicians.  We propose that citizens will 
find political parties trustworthy on the basis of their delivery in office of policy promises 
made during the preceding election. Similarly, citizens will find politicians trustworthy 
according to the extent to which their performance in office matches their promises in 
opposition. We hypothesize: 
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H3: Citizens will find political parties trustworthy according to whether they deliver 
on their policy promises (See question 3 in tables 1 & 2) 
H4: Citizens will find politicians trustworthy according to whether they deliver on 
their policy promises (See question 5 in tables 1 & 2) 
 
Moral Trust 
In contrast with strategic trust’s rationalist, calculating approach to a trust judgement, a 
second leading strand in the literature focuses on the trusting characteristics of the truster. 
This is a normative approach that focuses on the moral commitment to be trustworthy, 
where trust is a moral norm that individuals are socialized to follow (Becker 1996; Held 
1968; Hertzberg 1988; Horsburgh 1960; Jones 1996; Mansbridge 1999). On this reading, the 
character of the truster is essential to believing that most other people can be trusted, 
regardless of previous experience of the actual trustworthiness of other actors. As Uslaner 
(2002, 2) argues, trust is not exclusively experiential, but comes from an optimistic 
worldview that presumes strangers are trustworthy: “Trust in other people is based upon a 
fundamental ethical assumption: that other people share your fundamental values.  They 
don’t necessarily agree with you political or religiously.  But at some fundamental level, 
people accept the argument that they have common bonds that make cooperation vital. 
And these commons bonds rest upon assumptions about human nature. The world is a 
beneficent place composed of people who are well-intentioned (and thus trustworthy)”. 
Putting this form of trust in formal terms, A trusts B (as well as C, D, etc.) based on A’s 
belief in the moral good of trusting others.  Therefore, B is trustworthy simply because A’s 
norm is to trust B regardless of B’s interests.   
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There is significant empirical evidence that some form of moral trust operates in the 
political sphere, in the form of field studies (Ostrom 1998; Newton 2002), historical case 
studies (Rothstein 2000), experimental approaches (Sally 1995), survey research (Inglehart 
1999; Torpe 2000; Uslaner 2002), and international comparative research (Svallfors 1997; 
Kumlin 2002; Rothstein and Steinmo 2002).  However, the empirical data are less clear 
about moral trust in politicians and political parties. Drawing on the World Values Survey, 
Uslaner (2002, 226-37) argues that democracies have higher levels of moral trust than 
authoritarian states, that greater economic equality drives higher levels of moral trust, and 
that Protestant countries have higher moral trust than Muslim societies. In other words, 
despite the current debate around MPs’ expenses, bankers’ bonuses, and seemingly 
intractable tensions within a multicultural society, a broader view of the demographics of 
the UK suggests that citizens share common bonds that make cooperation vital. In this 
sense, citizens accept an ethical assumption that other people share their fundamental 
values.  Following this argument, we offer a hypothesis to examine the general moral form 
of trust judgement as it relates to politicians.  
H5: A citizen will trust politicians because they have been socialized to do so (See 
question 8 in tables 1 & 2) 
 
Uslaner also makes an important and productive distinction for the trust judgement of 
political institutions between a “generalized” and “particularized” moral trust. While 
generalized trusters find others trustworthy, particularized trusters only find trustworthy 
“people of our own kind or our close friends” (1999, 124), for example, family, similar 
ethnic or religious groups. Particularized trust is typically formed in contradistinction to 
others outside the group. Individuals build strong bonds based on reciprocity and trust 
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within their own group (“us”), spurred on by group identification in contrast with other 
groups (“them”). Because these bonds grow stronger and more exclusive, cooperative 
action with others becomes less likely, thus further reducing the possibility for broad 
collective decision-making. Particularized trusters are unlikely to seek out others, do not 
feel responsible for others on a moral level, and seek to resolve disputes through 
confrontation. In contrast with generalized trusters, particularized trusters are pessimistic 
about life and, as such, have a tendency towards introversion and asocial prioritization of 
their own group’s interests. They are not seen as cooperative and generally believe others 
to be uncooperative as well, perhaps justifying their own behaviour. However, 
particularized trusters are not social isolates. They do trust and work cooperatively with 
some people, just not all people. For example, particularized trust facilitates the civic 
engagement of many specialized interests groups, from grassroots community 
organizations to national advocacy groups (Skocpol 2003). They associate, but only within 
a close-knit network of people that share similar traits and interests, like political party 
affiliation.  In other words, particularized trusters engage, but only with each other, and 
not cautiously within the broad political sphere.  Following this argument, we offer two 
hypotheses that seek to separate the generalized from the particularized form of moral 
trust as it relates to trust judgements in political parties. 
H6: Citizens will trust a political party that is inclusive of different types of people 
with different interests because they can share in general common goals (See 
question 6 in tables 1 & 2) 
 
H7: Citizens will trust a political party with whom they share a common identity 
(See question 7 in tables 1 & 2) 
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Deliberative Trust 
A third strand in the literature focuses on the final component of the trust judgement—the 
presence of mechanisms to protect the truster from betrayal by the trustee.4  Trust is taken 
here as a facilitating mechanism for collective action occurs through deliberation, 
innovation and cooperation rather than through a strategic, rational judgement of the 
trustee’s interests or a moral judgement about human nature (Mendelberg 2002; Bornstein 
and Rapoport 1988; Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland 1994; Larmore 1994; Orbell et al. 1988). A 
form of ‘deliberative trustworthiness’ describes the process of judgement where an 
individual first decides whether other actors involved in the decision-making process are 
sufficiently trustworthy to merit accepting their future promises of collective action. Once 
this initial judgement on the conditions of engagement in the political sphere can and has 
been made, the individual can participate in the broadly-defined political process by acting 
on promises resulting from the trustworthy decision-making process.  
 
Deliberative theorists have investigated how another’s trustworthiness may be assessed in 
order to determine whether agreement may be reached through deliberation (Galston 1988; 
Benhabib 1989; Christiano 1996; Bohman 1996; Elster 1998; Young 1999).  Generally, these 
theorists take ‘trustworthiness’ to mean an individual’s cognitive judgement of another 
political actor’s motivation based on the nature of his deliberative relationship with that 
actor such that future cooperation may be possible between them.  Habermas (1984) has 
arguably done most to isolate the criteria of deliberative trustworthiness with his account 
of how societies develop “second order” consensus—the methods of voting, bargaining, 
and compromise whereby public opinion is molded by argument and congeals around one 
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course of political action. Habermas makes a basic distinction between action framed by 
deliberation with others and action framed solely by one’s own preferences.  
Communicative action, as Habermas presents it (1984), is oriented towards inter-subjective 
understanding, the coordination of actions through discussion, and the socialization of 
members of the community.  
 
This type of action stands in opposition to strategic action (inherent in the strategic trust 
form) where social action is oriented to success in influencing the actions of other rational 
actors. Communicative action involves actors in “the cooperative negotiation of common 
definitions of the situation” in which they are interacting (Habermas 1985, 137) so that they 
can pursue their individual plans without harming other actors’ interests.  Communicative 
action gains its motivational force by a “telos of consent, inherent in language itself” (ibid, 
157) that motivates individual deliberators to judge whether another participant is 
deliberating as an equal and striving for consensus, or is acting strategically and gaming 
the deliberative process for an advantageous outcome. By comparison, strategic action 
does not have the same restrictive criteria for success.  It is simply the pursuit of one’s own 
interests by accepting any reasonable promise on offer from any source. By accepting 
promises without engaging in the deliberative process, the citizen cannot cooperatively 
negotiate “common definitions of the situation” and so must accept a position of limited 
information, and the heightened risks of betrayal that entails.    
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While there is much discussion in the literature on the practical potential of communicative 
action, there is agreement across the spectrum that the deliberative aspect of 
communicative action provides a motivation to seek criteria by which to judge the 
trustworthiness of other deliberators.  For example, Mansbridge’s (1983) analysis of town 
meeting and workplace democracy; Hunold and Young (1996) have developed 
deliberative criteria applicable to aspects of the planning process; Chambers (1996) has 
examined the language-rights politics of Quebec; and Fung (2004) has produced a useful 
theory of empowered participation in the urban setting.  
 
Habermas sets out the cognitive criteria by which an individual may judge the 
trustworthiness of other deliberators, like politicians and political parties.  At the level of 
the political institutions like political parties and politicians is the concept of 
institutionalized deliberative mechanisms. Here, the trustworthiness of an institution is 
located in the extent to which its institutional structures promote fair and equitable 
deliberation with citizens. These structures should be aimed at full, equal, informed, and 
un-coerced participation in the rule- and regulation-making process by individuals who 
are guaranteed the freedoms and opportunities necessary to achieve this end (Habermas 
1996, 305-7). What gives legitimacy to the eventual outcomes of this deliberative process 
(i.e. public policy proposals) is that “the only regulations and ways of acting that can claim 
legitimacy are those to which all who are possibly affected could assent in rational 
discourse” (1996, 458).  Legitimation in the execution of their public policy proposals – the 
end goal of political parties – therefore requires channels for regulating the deliberative 
process of political institutions like political parties, so that they are not overwhelmed by 
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non-deliberative means.  In the case of political parties, the most powerful non-deliberative 
actors are large party funders who achieve and exercise their power by channeling 
resources to support their favoured policies rather than by winning support through 
deliberation with the party’s wider supporter base. The trust judgement in parties is 
therefore related to the perceived fairness and equitableness of a political party’s 
deliberative mechanisms. This argument offers the following hypothesis:  
H8: Citizens trust political parties whose policies reflect the interests of a wide range 
of their supporters rather than the interests of a small number of their funders (See 
Question 9 in tables 1 & 2) 
 
Institutionalized deliberative mechanisms offer a means by which political parties may be 
challenged. While citizens may not agree with all a party’s policy proposals, its 
institutionalized “challengeability” makes it worthy of being trusted by citizens. More 
broadly, national and local elections institutionalize the “challengeability” of political 
parties at regular and predictable intervals. This institutional framework means that a 
citizen’s judgement of a party’s trustworthiness does not rely (cf. H1) on whether his/her 
individual interests in a policy matter are encapsulated in that party’s interests in the 
policy area. Rather, a political party’s trustworthiness is based on the degree to which the 
party’s institutional structures promote, and accept the result of, fair and equitable 
deliberation with citizens. According to this argument, we propose the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H9: Citizens trust political parties that participate fully in, and abide by the results 
of, democratic elections (See Question 10 in tables 1 & 2) 
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Institutionalized deliberative mechanisms employed by politicians – the ways in which 
politicians promote fair and equitable deliberation with citizens – range from weekly one-
on-one ‘surgeries’ for constituents to open-door parliamentary scrutiny committees to 
nationally televised press conferences.  Politicians can be judged trustworthy according to 
the extent they make themselves available for these forms of deliberative process.  
Contrary to the particularized form of moral trust where citizens only trust politicians with 
similar traits and interests to themselves, the presence of deliberative mechanisms allows 
citizens to find trustworthy politicians from across the broad political sphere. Following 
this argument, we hypothesize: 
H10: Citizens trust politicians to the extent politicians deliberate openly and 
generally, even if the same citizens disagree with the process outcome (See Question 
11 in tables 1 & 2) 
 
 
At the level of decision-making that includes facilitators (e.g. politicians) of the political 
process, is the concept of trustworthiness as a “relief mechanism”.  Habermas recognizes 
that communication is not always language-based (1987, 185).  In post-traditional societies, 
where communication increasingly takes place in plural sites beyond the confines of 
linguistic discourse, participants need some form of “relief mechanism” to help mitigate 
the real or perceived threats from the non-language-based communication in the political 
sphere. Habermas focuses on internalities like prestige and influence because they reach 
beyond the particular space and time of the present situation and are recognizable and 
dominant within the groups where they pertain. This means they can substitute for mutual 
understanding where language and verbal communication are not possible. 
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Facilitators—particularly politicians but also journalists, political activists, policy experts—
have what Habermas calls interactive responsibility and proficiency over knowledge.  
Their facilitating power is based on the relative qualities of their contributions to the public 
discourse. Habermas (1987, 179) argues that “When a prestigious or influential person 
takes the initiative, he can count on receiving a certain ‘advance’ of trust or confidence, 
which may be paid out in a readiness for consensus and obedience that goes beyond any 
single situation”. So the trustworthiness of a facilitator comes from his prestige and 
influence being accepted as a functional relief from the inherent uncertainty of the political 
sphere, so allowing citizens to commit to future collective actions.   
 
Prestige is ascribed to the individual actor; influence to the flow of communication itself.  
They are mutually reinforcing and interdependent—it is seldom the case that one exists 
without the other. The source of prestige is personal attributes like technical proficiency in 
the political process (getting elected to Parliament) and intellectual achievement 
(understanding, and being able to manipulate, how the political process works) (1987, 181).  
The primary source of influence is a learnt knowledge of the traditions of the political 
process (understanding how to get selected as a parliamentary candidate and how to 
campaign for office, ibid).  Following this argument, we hypothesize: 
H11: Citizens will trust politicians depending on whether they are perceived to be 
prestigious and influential (See Questions 12 & 13 in Tables 1 & 2) 
 
 
In the next section we test these hypotheses for evidence of which types of trust are most 
pertinent across different institutions.   
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Data and Methodology  
The data for this study were generated from YouGov’s weekly online British Omnibus 
survey (N=1,753; July 2007) and the British Election Study Continual Monitoring Panel 
(N=1,018; March 2009).  Using nationally representative samples, we asked two sets of 
questions on political trust.  First, and drawing on arguments presented in the literature 
review, respondents were asked to estimate how much trust they had in parties and 
politicians using an 11-point scale.  These questions replicate the standard trust questions 
asked in the 2005 British Election Study (BES) and are used for comparison and capture 
overall, but undifferentiated levels of trust.5  Second, to operationalise the strategic, moral 
and deliberative forms of trust judgements, and to test the eleven hypotheses we derived a 
series of statements and asked respondents the extent to which they agreed or disagreed 
with statements on political parties and politicians on a 5-point Likert scale.   
 
The choice of politicians and political parties as institutions is a ‘critical’ test for our 
conceptualization of political trust.  One the one hand, it could be reasonably argued that 
electors perceive parties and politicians as essentially the same institution and thus employ 
the same mechanisms in their calculus to trust.  If this is the case, we should find no 
evidence of different trust mechanism at work.  We, however, take the position that parties 
and politicians, while related, are not the same.6  Whereas other (political) institutions, (e.g. 
Bank of England, judiciary), may provide for a greater contrast vis-à-vis parties and 
politicians in testing for different forms of trust, it is precisely the case where we have 
similar but different institutions that provides the most robust test of our 
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conceptualization.  The analysis proceeds in two parts: first, we examine the relative 
importance of the different forms of political trust judgements, and second, we examine 
these judgements to gauge whether political trust is affected by political context--e.g. 
testing for a correlation between trust in parties and politicians and supporters of the three 
major parties in Britain, Labour, Conservatives, and Liberal Democrats. 
  
Our claim that different forms of trust operate simultaneously in the political sphere rests 
on demonstrating that the operationalisation of these three forms is construct valid; or 
alternatively, that the three forms of trust are theoretically informed, operationalised and 
tested with robust indicators that show an acceptable degree of correlation (Carmines and 
Zeller 1979, 23).  To operationalise strategic, moral and deliberative trust judgements we 
developed a series of 13 survey questions that aim to measure the underlying theoretical 
construct for both political parties and politicians. Responses for the 2007 and 2009 data are 
detailed in Tables 1 and 2 respectively.  The next section provides a general outline of our 
approach in operationalizing the three forms of trust. 
 
Strategic trust: Questions 1-5 measure the extent to which respondents’ feel, on balance, 
parties’ policies encapsulate their policy interests and the extent to which politicians 
generally (rather than one’s own elected representative) succeed in attending to the 
respondents’ particular interests, as well as recognising that respondents’ individual 
interests may be bound up in more general values and collective identities that play out in 
national debates, like immigration or gender issues.  In other words, these questions reflect 
Hardin’s argument that the judgement to trust is based on a rational understanding of the 
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other actor’s interests.  The individual calculus of trust resembles this line of thinking: to 
the extent that a political party and/or politician’s policies encapsulate my own interests I 
find them trustworthy to get on with the activities of governance; when parties and 
politicians no longer represent my interests, I no longer judge them trustworthy to govern.  
Of course, this rationalist calculus is made easier for citizens when knowledge of relevant 
past performance is available. Questions 3 and 5 tap into the extent to which the judgement 
to trust is a backward-looking assessment of the performance of previous promises.  
 
Moral trust: Question 8 measures the extent to which individuals find politicians 
trustworthy regardless of previous experience.  Perhaps surprisingly in light of the well-
documented lack of trust in the political system, we hypothesize that individuals will trust 
politicians depending on the individuals’ socialisation to trust.  Second, and following 
Uslaner, moral trust taps the extent to which individuals find parties trustworthy on the 
basis of a generalized trust (Q6) or a particularized trust (Q7).  Here we aim to separate out 
the impetus of the individual trust calculus: is it based on judging whether the party to be 
trusted shares similar traits and interests with the citizen, or whether the party should be 
trusted according to the citizen’s socialization to trust?  
 
Deliberative trust: Questions 9-13 measure deliberative trust by tapping citizens’ perceived 
access to the political process.  In a deliberative political sphere, individuals recognise that 
the diversity of political interests means increased competition and participation in the 
political sphere for preferred policy outcomes.  With an extended sphere, individuals 
cannot expect to ‘win’ every time and thus adopt a rationalist attitude toward outcomes: so 
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long as political debate is open and procedurally legitimate, individuals can accept ‘losing’ 
on electoral or policy outcomes.  We now examine the empirical evidence for our 
hypotheses.   
 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Our first task is to demonstrate why existing empirical measures of trust are not sufficient 
in discriminating between trust forms operating in different political institutions.  We 
show this by simply correlating overall levels of trust in parties and politicians (measured 
on the standard 11-point scale).  The correlation is remarkably high (r= 0.914, p < .01) and 
suggests two possible interpretations.  The first interpretation is that the underlying forms 
of trust employed by citizens for parties and politicians are indifferent, and any decision to 
trust involves the same underlying mechanism(s).  This interpretation represents the 
approach taken by extant work on trust; essentially that of a single theoretical 
conceptualisation of trust operationalised and measured by the traditional 11-point scale 
survey question asking, ‘How much trust do you have in government?’  A second possibility 
however, is that the correlation conceals as much as it reveals.  By using a single theoretical 
approach to measure trust, we are unable to determine whether there are differences in 
what generates trust in parties and politicians, or indeed any other institution.  The high 
degree of correlation between levels of trust in two separate institutions suggests that there 
could be a potential failure to discriminate between forms of underlying trust and 
therefore creates a spurious degree of correlation in trust in different institutions.  Thus, 
the aim of this article is to test whether there is any empirical evidence to support 
theoretically distinct forms of trust. 
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What evidence then, do we find for our hypotheses regarding different forms of trust?  
Tables 1 and 2 details responses to individual questions in both surveys. Generally 
speaking, the net scores (agree minus disagree) are similar for both the 2007 and 2009 
surveys.  Notable differences between the results of the two surveys are highlighted in the 
discussion.  
 
In respect of H1 (see questions 1 & 2), there is suggestive evidence that parties serve 
political interests reasonably well.  In the 2007 survey, nearly two-thirds of respondents 
indicate that they can usually find a party to vote for that reflects some of their views, and 
disagreement with this statement is relatively modest (especially compared with the other 
questions in this survey).  In the 2009 survey, nearly three quarters of respondents take this 
view. Thus, citizens develop strategic trust in political parties if those parties offer 
positions policies that are of concern to the citizen, or if the winning party reflects some of 
their concerns – in both surveys, a plurality indicate that whoever wins an election, at least 
some of the respondents’ views will be reflected.  In respect of H2 (see question 4), we see 
that politicians are perceived, on balance, to be considering issues that matter to 
respondents – a clear majority in both surveys take this view. In respect of performance, 
however (H3 and H4 – see questions 3 and 5), there is clear pattern suggesting that neither 
parties nor politicians are perceived to deliver on their promises, and therefore are 
afforded less strategic trust.  Respondents clearly indicate that they do not feel that parties 
or politicians deliver on past promises and the results are remarkably similar over both 
surveys (see questions 3 and 5). 
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In terms of moral trust, there are mixed results for parties and politicians.  On the one 
hand, the perceived utility of parties and politicians to deliver collective goals, and 
therefore a form of moral trust is demonstrated.  Relatively slim pluralities in both surveys 
support the idea of political parties as a means of achieving common goals supported by 
citizens of different backgrounds (H6 – see question 6).  For politicians, however, only a 
small proportion sees politicians as sharing the same goals and values (H5 – see question 8). 
In addition, less than 20% see party activists as being similar to them (H7 – see question 7). 
In each case, the results of both surveys are very similar.    
 [Insert tables 1 and 2 here] 
 
In respect of deliberative trust, there would appear to be support for process by parties and 
politicians.  First, there is clear support in both surveys for the notion of competitive 
elections over partisan interest (H9 – see question 10).  Citizens develop deliberative trust 
towards parties when the consequences of election outcomes are clear, even if these 
consequences may not chime with the citizen’s own interests.  Equally, there is a 
preference for process over outcome in respect of decisions taken by politicians (H10 – see 
question 11). In both surveys, a slim plurality favours full discussion over the outcome, 
which may or may not serve the respondent’s interests.  Second, while politicians generate 
strategic trust by broadly reflecting respondents’ concerns, their discussions mediated 
through Parliament were not considered in positive light in 2007.  By 2009, however, a 
plurality felt that politicians were discussing the issues of most importance to the country 
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(H11 – see question 12).  In addition, nearly two- thirds in both surveys recognize the utility 
of politicians to consider complex issues on behalf of citizens (H11 – see question 13). 
  
Third, parties lack deliberative trust through a lack of confidence in parties’ integrity in 
terms of favouring financial supporters (H8 – see question 9).  However, it should be 
pointed out that this finding may have been exaggerated by the context of the 2007 survey.  
At the time, the ‘loans for peerages’ episode was still lingering on, and despite no charges 
being brought, press comment on the episode was largely negative.  As Kleinnijenhuis et 
al. (2006, 98) show, ‘malaise news‘ tends to lead to distrust in party leaders. The 2009 
survey, while still delivering a negative net score, suggests that the events of 2006 and 2007 
served to depress the level of this deliberative trust judgement.  
 
Our next step is to evaluate the extent to which these forms of trust are themselves related 
across institutions. In other words, although we are seeking to measure different types of 
trust in different institutions, the forms of trust should still themselves be related, 
regardless of the institution under investigation. We examine this by creating scales of 
strategic, moral and deliberative trust judgements using the items for both parties and 
politicians.  Using Cronbach’s Alpha, we can see that reliability between the items is good 
(the scores are .815, .741 and .689 for strategic, moral and deliberative trust respectively). 
These results suggest that our forms of trust are robust because despite different questions 
being asked about different institutions, the alpha scores indicate that the items hang 
together reliably.  
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We test our principal hypothesis, that different forms of trust will be more or less evident 
depending upon the institution in which trust is placed, by regressing measures of the 
various forms of trust against the overall level of trust in the relevant institution (parties or 
politicians) using the standard 11-point scale. Despite our criticisms of the single 
theoretical approach which informs this measurement, its use as a dependent variable is 
justified because it should capture all the myriad forms of trust in that institution. Thus, 
while the use of the 11-point scale cannot differentiate between the forms of trust detailed 
in this article and their relative importance to differing institutions, the unidimensional 
scale should capture an overall level of trust.   
 
In order to test our hypothesis, it is necessary to be able to evaluate the relative impact of 
different forms of trust. All of our different trust judgements are measured on the same 
five-point scale. We can therefore directly compare the b coefficients for each form of trust 
judgement within each regression. In each model, the dependent variable is overall level of 
trust in the relevant institution. The independent variables are measurements of various 
forms of trust judgement in that institution. In addition, we add three demographic control 
variables available in both datasets: social class, sex and age.  Pattie et al. (2004, 62) suggest 
that all three of these have a bearing on trust in politicians. Class and sex are coded as 
dummy variables such that social groups A, B, and C1 are coded as 1, and C2, D and E as 
0;7 and men are coded 1 and women as 0. For age, previous studies have suggested a 
curvilinear relationship with trust in government (Curtice and Bromley 2002, 146) and 
politicians (Pattie et al. 2004, 62). As is common practice, we use age-squared alongside age 
as control variables. Finally, given the characteristics of the dependent variable, the 
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regressions were run in two forms: OLS using the stepwise method and ordered logit. The 
results were virtually identical, and as a consequence, we report the results from the OLS 
regressions for ease of interpretation.   
 
Tables 3 and 4 illustrate the results of the relevant regression analyses. All three forms of 
trust judgement contribute positively to overall levels of trust in parties (table 3), while the 
control variables have no statistically significant impact. In both 2007 and 2009, strategic 
trust captured through an evaluation of whether parties do what they say they will do has 
the strongest effect on generating overall levels of trust. Moreover, the standard errors of 
each coefficient indicate that the differences between the coefficients for this item and other 
independent variables are themselves statistically significant. In the 2007 dataset, all three 
forms of strategic trust have a positive impact on trust. In addition, deliberative trust 
(measured through an assessment of whom parties represent – supporters or funders) and 
moral trust (measured through an assessment of party members being similar to 
respondents) also contribute positively, though moral trust has least impact overall.  In the 
2009 study, we again see that forms of strategic trust are dominant, both being statistically 
significant from other positive judgements (the same deliberative and moral ones as in 
2007). Interestingly, the second deliberative judgement in parties, which focuses on the 
electoral process, has a negative impact on overall trust in parties. 
 
If we compare these results with those for politicians (table 4), there are both similarities 
and differences. As for parties, all forms of trust contribute positively to overall levels of 
trust in politicians in 2007. And strategic trust, measured by evaluations of whether 
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politicians keep their promises has the strongest impact on overall trust – more than 
double that the next strongest judgement, moral trust.  This moral judgement is statistically 
significant in terms of impact compared with a measurement of deliberative trust 
(measuring the degree to which politicians discuss the most important issues) and a 
further example of strategic trust. The results in 2009 are similar with the strategic and 
moral judgements that are most significant in 2007, again being reflected and in the same 
order. As with parties, none of the control variables reach traditional levels of statistical 
significance.   
 
Overall, the results for parties and politicians both reveal that the generation of trust is a 
function of all three forms of judgement, but to varying degrees. For both parties and 
politicians, most trust is generated through a form of strategic trust – keeping promises. 
For parties, however, moral judgements are generally less important. Here, we see some 
difference compared with politicians, where moral judgements are significantly more 
important than deliberative judgements. By way of contrast, deliberative judgements are 
much more significant for generating trust in parties.  In sum, then, our broad hypothesis 
is offered some support by the data.  Despite the institutions of parties and politicians 
being ostensibly similar, there are notable differences in the relevance of different trust 
judgements. While strategic trust (measured by perceptions of parties and politicians 
fulfilling their promises) is most significant in generating overall levels of trust for both, 
moral trust judgements are much more significant for politicians. Equally, deliberative 
trust judgements matter more in the case of parties. 
[Insert tables 3 and 4 here] 
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Given that our broad hypothesis is offered some support by the data, it is now worth 
examining whether political context matters at all. Curtice and Bromley (2002, 144-148) 
show that temporal context is a factor in levels of trust and well as whether one is a 
supporter of the incumbent or opposition parties. For example, in 1996, Conservative 
supporters had higher levels of trust in government to put the nation’s interests first, but 
following the 1997 election, higher levels were found amongst Labour supporters—an 
observation that was repeated in 2001.8  Similarly, Pattie et al. (2004, 252-4) found that trust 
in elected politicians was highest amongst Labour supporters (and indeed rose between 
2000 and 2001 following Labour’s second landslide victory). Such patterns are repeated 
elsewhere.  Bélanger and Nadeau (2005, 125) note higher levels of trust amongst incumbent 
supporters in Canada, while Dalton and Weldon (2005, 941) show in a thirteen country 
study that supporters of opposition parties are more likely to be distrustful of parties. And, 
as Banducci and Karp (2003) show, ‘losers’ in consensual systems tend to be less 
dissatisfied than losers in majoritarian ones.  Given that Britain uses a first past the post 
system at Westminster level, we may therefore expect to see different patterns of trust 
emerging from supporters of different parties, depending upon electoral success or failure. 
Broadly speaking, if there is variation, we might expect ‘losers’ to have lower levels of 
strategic trust, since as losers, their interests may be encapsulated to a lesser degree than 
winners. Equally, other forms of strategic trust measuring perceptions of delivery by 
parties and politicians may vary by partisanship—winners may have more of this type of 
trust. In terms of deliberative trust, ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ may also differ on questions of 
process – ‘winners’ may well be more outcome focussed than ‘losers’. 
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We test these hypotheses in tables 5 and 6, confining our analysis to supporters of the three 
principal parties.  Table 5 examines trust in parties, and again uses the overall level of trust 
in parties as the dependent variable and includes the three demographic control variables 
of class, sex and age. It reveals firstly, that forms of strategic trust are significant for 
supporters of all three parties. That said, whereas all three strategic trust judgements are 
significant for Liberal Democrat supporters in both 2007 and 2009, only some are relevant 
for Conservative and Labour supporters. However, there are some differences between 
supporters of the different parties. First, while for Conservative and Labour supporters, 
forms of both moral and deliberative trust are also relevant; no form of moral trust is 
significant for Liberal Democrats. Second, in 2009, both Labour and Liberal Democrat 
supporters display less concern about the process of how elections take place than the 
outcome.  This is possibly to be expected in the case of Labour supporters, since their party 
is in power. More surprising is the stance of Liberal Democrats. That said, by 2009, one of 
the forms of strategic trust judgements (that any winning party will reflect some of a 
respondent’s view) is actually negatively signed amongst Liberal Democrats. Both of these 
findings may have been related to the likely prospect of a future Conservative government, 
with polls at the time (March 2009) showing a significant Conservative lead. Our control 
variable of social class is also statistically significant for Labour supporters in 2007—
middle class Labour supporters are more likely to have trust in parties than working-class 
ones. 
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These findings partially support our hypotheses. As predicted, the Conservatives only 
generate limited levels of strategic trust, while Labour and Liberal Democrat supporters 
are more consistently likely to generate trust through finding a party that reflects their 
views. The possible explanation for Liberal Democrat supporters being similar in this 
respect to those of Labour is the ideological proximity of Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats (at least up to the 2005 general election) (Bara 2006), which would be more 
likely to generate a greater range of strategic trust judgements than in the case of the 
Conservatives.  Indeed, this suggestion is supported by the earlier finding that Labour and 
Liberal Democrat supporters developed less support for the electoral process rather than 
the outcome as the likelihood of a Conservative government grew. 
 
For trust in politicians (table 6), there is again some variation across parties.  For all three, 
strategic trust in the form of politicians keeping their promises has a very strong impact – 
consistently strongest in both years for Conservative and Labour supporters and in 2007 
for Liberal Democrats. However, while Labour supporters generate moral trust in each 
year, Conservatives only do so in 2007 and Liberal Democrats in 2009. Similarly, 
deliberative trust is not consistently generated by any party supporters, either in form or 
over time. Intriguingly, for both Labour and the Conservatives, social class has a 
statistically significant impact in 2007, though again, in a counter-intuitive way. Higher 
levels of trust in politicians are found in working-class Conservative supporters and 
middle-class supporters of Labour. Amongst Liberal Democrat supporters, women are 
more likely to trust politicians in 2007 
[Insert tables 5 and 6 here] 
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On the face of it, these results could be seen as puzzling given the patterns we find with 
parties. However, they are less puzzling if we acknowledge that forms of trust may vary 
by institution. Despite the similarity between parties and politicians, further differences 
emerge between the two in terms on trust judgement when we control for party support.  
 
 
Conclusion   
In this article, we aim to move away from previous research on trust in arguing that 
different forms of political trust operate simultaneously in the political sphere. The article 
highlights a clear example where theorists and empiricists have ignored the work of one 
another, and addresses a productive lacuna in previous work. Drawing on two unique 
datasets from 2007 and 2009, we identify and test three forms of trust judgements—
strategic, moral and deliberative—and find evidence of variation in types of trust for 
political parties and politicians. We present two key findings using data from Britain, first 
that the importance of different types of trust varies according to political institution and 
second, that this variation is furthered amplified when controlling for party preference.  
 
While this article shows support for the three forms of trust judgement, the need for 
additional work across different and non-traditional political institutions is clear. As 
stakeholders in democratic institutions, citizens engage with a disparate number of public 
institutions, regulatory bodies, local authorities, third sector organizations, and the media. 
Each type of institutional setting and configuration has potentially different combinations 
of trust appropriate to it.  In order to maximize an institution’s specific levels of trust, its 
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management and employees may be forced to work in unfamiliar and uncomfortable 
ways. For example, regulatory bodies may need to learn how to foster trustworthiness 
with a broad set of stakeholders (rather than industry insiders) in order to drive 
deliberative trust.  Similarly, third sector organizations may need to reach beyond the 
norms and values they share with their supporters—norms and values that form the basis 
of their particularized moral trust model—in order to deliver services to their users who 
may respond instead to a deliberative trust model based on involvement in service 
provision planning. 
 
As we move away from more traditional political institutions to global governance, we 
ought to investigate why recent survey data suggests large corporations are more trusted 
by citizens than government institutions (Edelman 2008).  There is prima facie evidence that 
corporations tailor their stakeholder relations strategies around the forms of trust most 
appropriate to their audiences. Of course, many businesses seek to encapsulate the 
financial interests of the customers/shareholders in their own interests. More pertinently, 
UK supermarkets seek to build particularized moral trust with their customers by 
supporting IT investment in community schools—there is a shared norm in promoting 
local children’s education. More broadly, major news media companies have built online 
discussion forums where the general public can deliberatively interact with journalists—
this builds trustworthiness in the company’s brand and promise-acceptance of content by 
the general public.  There are unexplored implications here for politicians and political 
parties across Europe: for public-private partnerships running health, education and 
housing services, for the respective authority given to corporations and regulators in 
 34 
tackling climate change, and even to help explain the rise of entrepreneurs as successful 
anti-politicians in Italy, Malaysia, Thailand, and Russia. 
 
Knowing how and under what conditions citizens trust political institutions may help to 
shed light on one of the more enduring debates on political trust, that is, whether citizen 
trust is a prerequisite for good democratic government, and what, if anything, 
governments can do to boost levels of trust. Our analysis suggests politicians and parties 
should recognize which citizens are likely to trust them and according to what trust type 
that trust may be granted.  To this end, politicians and parties may be more electorally 
successful if they stop trying to be trusted by all citizens and recognize how their promises, 
processes and personalities will appeal (or not) to subsections of the electorate according to 
the three forms of trust we outline in this article.  Our results suggest that parties and 
politicians should be careful in what they promise to electors, because it is precisely over-
promising and subsequently under-delivering that limits or damages trust.  
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Table 1.  Responses to Questions on Trust 2007 
 
 
 
Trust Form 
 
 
Institution 
 
 
Question 
Strongly/ 
Tend to 
Agree (%) 
Strongly/ 
Tend to 
Disagree 
(%) 
 
Net 
Score 
Strategic  Parties (1) I can usually find a political party to vote 
for that reflects at least some of my views 
62 20 +42 
  (2 )The political party that wins an election 
will usually reflect at least some of my views 
37 29 +8 
  (3) When political parties win power, they 
generally do what they say they would 
16 64 -48 
 Politicians (4)The issues that politicians consider reflect 
at least some of my concerns 
53 23 +30 
  (5) On balance, politicians deliver on their 
promises 
12 66 -54 
Moral  Parties (6) Political parties that stand for election 
bring together different types of people to 
achieve common goals 
37 31 +6 
  (7) People involved in political parties are 
people just like me 
19 64 -45 
 Politicians (8) Politicians share the same goals and values 
as me 
12 61 -49 
Deliberative  Parties (9) Political parties try and represent their 
supporters not just those who fund them 
24 47 -23 
  (10) It is more important to me that British 
elections are properly democratic than which 
party wins power 
64 15 +49 
 Politicians (11) It doesn’t matter if I agree with the 
outcome, so long as politicians have a full 
opportunity to discuss an issue 
35 30 +5 
  (12) For the most part, politicians discuss the 
issues that are most important to Britain 
34 39 -5 
  (13) One of the reasons why it is important to 
have politicians is that we need people who are 
able to consider and debate the many and 
complex issues that face us 
64 15 +49 
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Table 2.  Responses to Questions on Trust 2009 
 
 
 
Trust Form 
 
 
Institution 
 
 
Question 
Strongly/ 
Tend to 
Agree (%) 
Strongly/ 
Tend to 
Disagree 
(%) 
 
Net 
Score 
Strategic  Parties     
  (1) I can usually find a political party to vote 
for that reflects at least some of my views 
72 11 +61 
  (2 )The political party that wins an election 
will usually reflect at least some of my views 
42 18 +24 
  (3) When political parties win power, they 
generally do what they say they would 
14 61 -47 
 Politicians (4)The issues that politicians consider reflect 
at least some of my concerns 
   
  (5) On balance, politicians deliver on their 
promises 
60 15 +45 
Moral  Parties (6) Political parties that stand for election 
bring together different types of people to 
achieve common goals 
   
  (7) People involved in political parties are 
people just like me 
39 25 +14 
 Politicians (8) Politicians share the same goals and values 
as me 
15 55 -40 
Deliberative  Parties (9) Political parties try and represent their 
supporters not just those who fund them 
31 39 -8 
  (10) It is more important to me that British 
elections are properly democratic than which 
party wins power 
66 14 +52 
 Politicians (11) It doesn’t matter if I agree with the 
outcome, so long as politicians have a full 
opportunity to discuss an issue 
38 31 +7 
  (12) For the most part, politicians discuss the 
issues that are most important to Britain 
46 28 +18 
  (13) One of the reasons why it is important to 
have politicians is that we need people who are 
able to consider and debate the many and 
complex issues that face us 
63 13 +50 
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Table 3. Trust Judgements in Parties 2007 and 2009 
 
  2007 2009 
 
  b S.E b S.E. 
 
 Constant 
 
2.037 ** (.207) 2.202 ** (.335) 
Strategic Parties keep promises 
 
.649 ** (.059) .823 ** (.086) 
 Can find a party that reflects my views 
 
.269 ** (.053) .474 ** (.083) 
 Winning party will reflect some of my views 
 
.246 ** (.059) n/s  
Moral People in parties are just like me 
 
.180 ** (.049) .297 ** (.077) 
 Parties bring people together 
 
n/s  n/s  
Deliberative Parties represent supporters, not funders 
 
.363 ** (.059) .235 ** (.079) 
 More important that elections are democratic 
than who wins 
 
n/s  -.234 ** (.071) 
Controls Class 
 
n/s  n/s  
 Sex 
 
n/s  n/s  
 Age 
 
n/s  n/s  
 Age Squared 
 
n/s  n/s  
Adjusted R2  .373  .332  
n  1436  679  
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Table 4. Trust Judgements in Politicians 2007 and 2009 
 
  2007 2009 
 
  b S.E b S.E. 
 
 Constant 
 
1.823 ** (.198) 2.004 ** (.290) 
Strategic Politicians keep promises 
 
.904 ** (.064) .944 ** (.083) 
 Politicians reflect my concerns 
 
.154 ** (.060) n/s  
Moral Politicians share my goals 
 
.413 ** (.065) .686 ** (.080) 
Deliberative Politicians discuss most import issues 
 
.218 ** (.059) n/s  
 Politicians needed for complex issues 
 
n/s  n/s  
 Discussion process more important than 
outcome 
 
n/s  n/s  
Controls Class 
 
n/s  n/s  
 Sex 
 
n/s  n/s  
 Age 
 
n/s  n/s  
 Age Squared 
 
n/s  n/s  
Adjusted R2  .402  .378  
n  1487  720  
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Table 5. Trust Judgements in Parties 2007 and 2009 
 
  Conservative Labour Lib Dems 
  2007 2009 
 
2007 2009 2007 2009 
  b S.E b S.E. 
 
b S.E b S.E. 
 
b S.E b S.E. 
 
 Constant 
 
4.161 
** 
(.411) 2.967 
** 
(.591) 1.854 
** 
(.356) 1.342 
** 
(.561) 3.327 
** 
(.541) 3.239 
** 
(.968) 
Strategic Parties keep 
promises 
 
.433 
** 
(.114) .486 
** 
(.140) .512 
** 
(.104) .685 
** 
(.160) .449 
** 
(.162) 1.254 
** 
(.182) 
 Can find a party 
that reflects my 
views 
 
n/s  .378   
* 
(.155) .335 
** 
(.110) .605 
** 
(.192) .284  
* 
(.134) .584 
** 
(.190) 
 Winning party 
will reflect some 
of my views 
 
n/s  n/s  n/s  n/s  .301  
* 
(.126) -.444  
* 
(.209) 
Moral People in parties 
are just like me 
 
.299 
** 
(.093) .520 
** 
(.125) .205  
* 
(.085) .397 
** 
(.146) n/s n/s n/s  
 Parties bring 
people together 
 
n/s  n/s  n/s  n/s  n/s n/s n/s  
Deliberative Parties represent 
supporters, not 
funders 
 
.242   
*    
(.107) n/s  .394 
** 
(.100) .365  
* 
(.171) .473 
** 
(.160) n/s  
 More important 
that elections are 
democratic than 
who wins 
 
n/s  n/s  n/s  -.300  
* 
(.137) n/s  -.378  
* 
(.178) 
Controls Class 
 
n/s  n/s  .352  
* 
(.172) n/s  n/s  n/s  
 Sex 
 
n/s  n/s  n/s  n/s  n/s  n/s  
 Age 
 
n/s  n/s  n/s  n/s  n/s  n/s  
 Age Squared 
 
n/s  n/s  n/s  n/s  n/s  n/s  
Adjusted R2  .160  .184  .284  .391  .322  .391  
n  422  250  401  163  178  108  
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Table 6. Trust Judgements in Politicians 2007 and 2009  
 
  Conservative Labour Lib Dems 
  2007 2009 
 
2007 2009 2007 2009 
  b S.E b S.E. 
 
b S.E b S.E. 
 
b S.E b S.E. 
 
 Constant 
 
3.948 
** 
(.449) 3.267 
** 
(.591) 1.491 
** 
(.322) 1.168  
* 
(.465) 4.087 
** 
(.556) 1.709  
* 
(.790) 
Strategic Politicians keep 
promises 
 
.755 
** 
(.129) 1.009 
** 
(.156) .777 
** 
(.101) .896 
** 
(.156) .865 
** 
(.143) .733 
** 
(.193) 
 Politicians reflect 
my concerns 
 
n/s  n/s  n/s  n/s  n/s  n/s  
Moral Politicians share 
my goals 
 
.380 
** 
(.112) n/s  .301 
** 
(.106) .575 
** 
(.154) n/s  .851 
** 
(.175) 
Deliberative Politicians discuss 
most import 
issues 
 
n/s  .277  
* 
(.123) .449 
** 
(.102) n/s  n/s  n/s  
 Politicians needed 
for complex 
issues 
 
n/s  n/s  n/s  .492 
** 
(.150) .512 
** 
(.126) n/s  
 Discussion 
process more 
important than 
outcome 
 
n/s  n/s  n/s  n/s  n/s  n/s  
Controls Class 
 
-.605 
** 
(.186) n/s  .392  
*   
(.164) n/s  n/s  .847  
* 
(.389) 
 Sex 
 
n/s  n/s  n/s  n/s  -.728 
** 
(.241) n/s  
 Age 
 
n/s  n/s  n/s  n/s  n/s  n/s  
 Age Squared 
 
n/s  n/s  n/s  n/s  n/s  n/s  
Adjusted R2  .223  .201  .364  .469  .294  .408  
n  432  259  407  173  184  111  
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 See for example, Dalton and Weldon, 2005, p. 935. 
2 For example, Burns and Kinder (2000, 4) criticise the National Election Studies question on trust: “We 
suspect that trust is domain-specific, but the measures of trust that dominate the empirical literature are 
based upon an entirely different assumption: namely, that people have in mind stable views about the 
trustworthiness of human nature in general.” 
3 Of course, politicians often seek a wider audience for their views beyond those citizens with an interest in 
those views.  In these cases, strategic trust is not relevant.   
4 This strand is not usually included in the political trust literature as it derives from deliberative democratic 
theory. As such, it has only recently been recognised by trust scholars (Tucker 2006).  
5 The standard trust question from the British Election Study asks: “Now, thinking about British political 
institutions like Parliament, please use the 0 to 10 scale to indicate how much trust you have for each of the 
following, where 0 means no trust and 10 means a great deal of trust”. 
6 There is some evidence, for example, that in the minds of electors, local politicians in much higher regard 
than political parties themselves (Bianco, 1994; Parker and Parker, 1993).   
7 Ideally, the impact of class would be measured by a series of dummy variables for each category minus one 
reference category. However, the data for the first survey were supplied in such a form that the existing 
dummy was the only one available. For comparability, we coded the 2009 data in the same way. 
8 Pattie and Johnston (2001, 204-9) made a similar finding in respect of voters at the 1997 election. Those who 
voted Labour were more likely to trust parties and politicians. 
